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NEWMAN’S VISION OF A UNIVERSITY:
THEN AND NOW
JAMES L. HEFT, S.M.
Institute for Advanced Catholic Studies
University of Southern California
Catholic universities face many challenges today. Increasing secularization,
faculty salaries, external funding, Catholic identity, academic freedom, and
institutional autonomy are among the most prominent. This essay examines the
contributions of John Henry Newman to Catholic higher education and argues
for their relevance today.

INTRODUCTION

I

s it possible to go from one period of history, one that started over 150
years ago, and make valid connections with the present times? Higher education, which in the United States in 1900 enrolled only 1% of the population, has undergone nothing less than a revolution over the last 100 years.
And given the genteel liberal arts tradition of Oxford in 1850, a tradition that
shaped John Henry Newman’s vision of education profoundly, it is more than
likely that Newman’s views about education, especially for people in the socalled developed world of the 21st century, will seem to be coming from not
just another century and another country, but from another world as well.
This article seeks to pay careful attention to the times—Newman’s and our
own—and then argues that, indeed, some of what was then in education
ought also to be now. We begin with a description of Newman’s life and
times.

NEWMAN AND HIS TIMES
Born into an Anglican family of bankers in London in 1801, John Henry
Newman underwent his first conversion at the age of 15 (later in his life he
referred to three conversions), one that left him for a while a devout evangelical. He enrolled at Oxford, was ordained an Anglican priest in 1825, and 3
years later was appointed the chaplain of St. Mary the Virgin Church in
Oxford. He held that position until 1843 when, as a consequence of his studies of the first 5 centuries of Christianity, his doubts about the Church of
Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 2007, 357-375
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England led him to convert to the Roman Catholic Church on October 9,
1845. After studying for a year in Rome, he was ordained a Catholic priest
in 1847 and returned to England to found an oratory in Birmingham. For
most of his adult life, he was trusted neither by most Anglicans when, as a
leader of the Oxford movement in the 1830s, he was one of them, nor by
most Catholics after he became one of them. Historian Turner (1996) states
that during his Anglican years, Newman
had been the chief disruptive academic personality in Oxford. In point of fact,
John Henry Newman had been the kind of faculty member whom every university administrator dreads, trustees deplore and fail to understand, and more
staid alumni find embarrassing, but whom students and the young among the
faculty and alumni cheer toward further extravagances. (p. 285)

All his life, he remained a gifted controversialist who, in the words of theologian Lash (1979), sought “to prove by persuasion rather than to persuade
by proof ” (p. 12). In all, Newman seemed too Catholic for the Anglicans,
and not sufficiently scholastic for most Catholics.
Pope Leo XIII made him a cardinal in 1879, despite the objection of
Newman’s own archbishop and cardinal, Henry Manning, who himself privately thought Newman to be a heretic. According to Newman, the reception
of the red hat lifted forever a cloud that had been hanging over him (Gilley,
1991). He continued to write, mainly revising and polishing a number of his
40 books, and died at the age of 89 on August 11, 1890. In 1975, Pope Paul
VI told the participants in a Newman symposium that
Many of the problems which he treated with wisdom—although he himself was
frequently misunderstood and misinterpreted in his own time—were the subjects of the discussion and study of the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council,
as for example the questions of ecumenism, the relationship between
Christianity and the world, the emphasis on the role of the laity in the Church
and the relationship of the Church to non-Christian religions. (as cited in Ford,
2005, p. 68)

On January 22, 1991, Pope John Paul II recognized Newman for his heroic
virtues and named him venerable. In 2001, Pope John Paul expressed the
hope that Newman, a “sure and eloquent guide in our perplexity” (p. 2),
might soon be declared “blessed,” the step before finally being canonized a
saint. The pope remarked that Newman had come eventually to “a remarkable synthesis of faith and reason,” a synthesis that helped him avoid both
rationalism which rejected “authority and transcendence,” and fideism which
turns away from “the challenges of history and the tasks of this world” and
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towards a “distorted dependence upon authority and the supernatural” (p. 2).
In the years since his death in 1890, Newman has not always been held
in such high regard. In fact, at the beginning of the last century, many of his
writings were associated with various so-called “modernist” writers who,
concerned with bringing the Church into a closer relationship with the modern age, were sharply rebuked with the encyclical, Pascendi Dominici
Gregis, by Pope Pius X (1907/1981). Newman’s writings on consulting the
laity, his attention to religious psychology in working out the process by
which a person makes an act of faith, and his conviction that doctrine develops over history made him suspect. In fact, there are still today, even though
Newman has enjoyed a sort of renaissance since Vatican II, scholars who for
various reasons not only disagree with some of his key ideas, but also actively oppose his canonization. For example, Fitzpatrick (1991) believes that
Newman depreciated reason to make faith more acceptable, and because he
saw little rational power in humanity, relied too much on papal authority.
The focus of this article is the writings of Newman on higher education
and their possible relevance to our own time and situation. These writings
were, on the whole, not as suspect as some of his other writings. In fact, his
major lectures on university education, collected in a volume entitled The
Idea of a University (1852/1976), went relatively unnoticed at the time they
were first published in the 1850s. In the United States, from the 1920s to the
1960s, a period the historian of Catholic higher education in the United
States, Gleason (1999), recently referred to as the “Golden Age of Newman’s
Idea,” Newman was often quoted by leaders of Catholic education, as well
as by the reforming president of the University of Chicago, Robert M.
Hutchins. But it is difficult to determine how influential his classic, The Idea
of a University, has in fact actually been. That the book has been highly
praised is not to be disputed. Pelikan (1992), for example, distinguished
Lutheran and then Orthodox historian of Christian doctrine and dean of the
graduate school at Yale, said that Newman’s Idea is “the most important treatise on the idea of the university ever written in any language” (p. 9).
But can such an estimate of Newman’s description of a university education, even one given by so eminent a scholar as Pelikan, actually stand? Was
not the world in which Newman lived so different from our own as to make
any application of his ideas impossible? J. M. Roberts, who served as the
vice chancellor of the University of Southampton and then the warden of
Merton College at Oxford, wrote a little more than a decade ago that
again and again...Newman’s assumptions reveal themselves to be so different
from ours, the background against which he writes is so utterly removed from
our own, the universities of his day are so unlike ours, either in their business
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or their ethos, that we cannot expect him to speak to our specific needs. (as
cited in Schiefen, 1995, p. 44)

To bring to light some of the specifics that characterized Newman’s time, we
need to remember that at that time only the elite were educated, all of whom
were males. Women’s colleges were founded at Cambridge in 1869 and
1870, and at Oxford in 1879. The research university with its intimate tie to
industry and commitment to professional and utilitarian education had yet to
establish its dominance, an elective system with majors and minors did not
exist, nor did the social sciences as we know them today. Moreover, Newman
assumed that every student should study the liberal arts before undertaking
any professional education.
Concentrating by contrast on problems that face an administrator of a
university today, historian Turner (1996), thinks Newman’s challenges were
simpler because he did not have a faculty that was unionized, a board of
trustees, a large and powerful alumni group, government regulations, or bigtime college athletics. And if all these specific historical differences were not
enough to render irrelevant any transfer of Newman’s thoughts about education to our own situation, the recently retired president of the University of
Rochester, O’Brien (1998), tells us that Newman’s Idea, “a favorite text for
commencement genuflections to ideals,” enjoyed “no institutional realization” (p. 8). For O’Brien, the fundamental issues of who makes what decisions are hardly touched upon in Newman’s work. The president of an actual university, continues O’Brien, “proclaiming reform needs to persuade a
suspicious faculty, a restive alumni body, a bottom-line board of trustees, and
a transient population of adolescents” (p. 8). In the face of all these judgments, will we have to conclude that Newman’s Idea of a University never
amounted to much simply because the university he was called upon to
found and lead was a failure, and that he realized after a few years that he
needed to resign as its president? Will the ill-fated Catholic University of
Ireland then be remembered, as Ker (1976) suggests, “only because of the
book to which it gave birth” (p. xxix), a book unable to inspire and sustain
the university it launched?

THE CHALLENGES NEWMAN FACED
Many things in higher education have changed since Newman’s time. In the
United States, and somewhat later in England itself, a great diversification of
educational institutions took place. In 1862, the United States government
established land grant institutions, and by the turn of the century, several
research universities had been established. More recently, community colleges have been established and for-profit institutions, like the University of
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Phoenix, have enrolled thousands of students. Not only has there been a huge
increase in the number of post-secondary students, but they are a much more
diverse group, no longer a small group of males from elite backgrounds. In
effect, the last 150 years has deregulated the monopoly a few universities
enjoyed in Newman’s time (Heft, 2003).
Nevertheless, with a better understanding of some of the challenges that
Newman faced when invited to found a Catholic university in Dublin, we
will see more clearly that they were every bit as formidable as dealing with
a board of trustees, protecting the academic freedom of professors, dealing
with increased competition, and persuading a skeptical public of the value of
a Catholic university education. Without a clearer understanding of what
Newman was up against, people today may be tempted to think of his idea of
a university as a sort of an untested ideal, a pure and but unrealizable conceptualization as far removed from reality now as it was then. But if we
become more aware of the practical issues he faced, the difficult obstacles he
had to overcome, we can more quickly see that he indeed has an important
legacy for us, one that is even more pragmatic and more challenging than the
idea of today’s secular research university. We turn now to a description of
some of the historical context in which Newman wrote the Idea of a
University, after which we will then delineate three difficult issues that we
face in higher education in our own time. Finally, the continuing importance
of Newman’s vision of the university should, by then, be apparent.
Up till the middle of the 19th century, Ireland could boast of only one
College, Trinity, established in 1591. A statute of 1637 required all students
to attend worship services and partake in communion according to the
Anglican practice, and that “an oath against Popery (Pontificia Religio)....be
taken by all the Fellows” (Livingstone, 2000, p. 188). Two centuries later,
after ignoring the plight of the Irish people during their devastating potato
famine, the British government, under the leadership of Sir Robert Peel,
decided in 1845 to establish three Queen’s Colleges, located in Belfast, Cork,
and Galway. These were to be non-sectarian colleges, that is, colleges that, in
the language of the day, offered “mixed education,” where Catholic and
Protestant students would mix with each other. Since no theology would be
taught, both Catholics and Protestants could attend these colleges, the government thought, without compromising their religious convictions. There
would be no religious tests for matriculation, nor religious requirements for
graduation. Shortly after the announcement of this government plan, the
Catholic bishops of Ireland met to decide how to react to the government initiative, “pregnant,” they thought, “with danger to faith and morals”
(O’Connell, 2004, p. 61). Within 2 years, the pope supported them in their
opposition to mixed education and instructed the Irish bishops to condemn

362

Catholic Education/March 2007

the entire initiative. Actually, not all the bishops agreed, though in public
they kept a united front (O’Connell, 2004).
In 1851, Archbishop Cullen, recently returned from 30 years in Rome
where he had served as the rector of the Irish College, invited Newman to
come to Dublin to present several lectures against mixed education. Cullen
also invited him to be the first rector of a Catholic college to be established
in Dublin. After some reflection, Newman accepted these invitations, and
presented five public lectures in the spring of 1852. The challenges he faced
were many and complex. First of all, he was not an Irishman, but an
Englishman, and though he shared the language with the Irish, he did not
share their culture. Second, he was a recent convert, even though a quite
famous one. Third, he had to speak to several different audiences, some of
whom disagreed with the others. For example, some bishops favored the
mixed education scheme, thinking that it was, under the circumstances, the
best they could do, while others wanted a seminary for laymen rather than a
university. Newman wanted to establish a university, a place where different
ideas would be debated and people would be free to pursue their thinking and
research—and all this in a nation where the Catholic Church was firmly
established. Many of the most prosperous Irish businessmen preferred to
send their sons abroad to be educated, while most of the others, having fresh
in their memories the suffering and starvation caused by the potato famine,
at its worst from 1845-1848, did not have as their top educational priority liberal education. Finally, Newman all along believed that he was founding a
university for English-speaking Catholics, not just Irish Catholics, a conviction not shared by most of his Irish audience. As one commentator put it, “the
Irish were too Irish to desire an education that should turn out an Irish replica of the ‘English gentleman’” (Harrold, 1947, p. xv). Archbishop Cullen
often refused to answer Newman’s requests while rector, and even criticized
his administration to Rome. And if all of these challenges in Ireland were not
enough, Newman was also facing, since August of 1851, a criminal action
for libel. In brief, a certain Giacinto Achilli, an ex-Dominican priest, had
been sentenced to imprisonment by the Roman Inquisition for sexual
immorality, including assault. Achilli escaped Italy, converted to
Protestantism and was going around England attacking the Catholic Church.
Newman attacked Achilli in print, relying on statements by his own bishop,
who subsequently was unable to verify his sources. Consequently, Newman
was found guilty of libel, but fined only a small amount in lieu of some time
in prison. Public sympathy sided with Newman, but the personal toll upon
him was great (Ker, 1990).
It was when all this was going on that he delivered many of the lectures
in Dublin on a Catholic university. Given the challenges he faced in Ireland,
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plus the additional emotional drain of a protracted process of the libel suit
against him, it is not surprising that he found the writing of his lectures the
most difficult task he had ever undertaken. Even though his lectures seemed
to be well received in Dublin, he said that they “have oppressed me more
than anything else of the kind in my life....I am out on the ocean with them,
out of sight of land, with nothing but the stars,” and again, “the most painful
of all” the books he wrote (as cited in Ker, 1976, pp. xvi-xvii). In the 1859
preface to the book version of his lectures, he, in the third person, wrote:
“They [the lectures] belong to a time, when he was tried both by sorrow and
anxiety, and by indisposition also, and required a greater effort to write, and
gave him less satisfaction when written, than any of his Volumes” (as cited
in Ker, 1976, p. xxxvii).
In summary then, while the specific challenges that Newman faced in
the 1850s are not all the same as the challenges that face someone leading an
institution of higher education today, they are nonetheless formidable.
Furthermore, by drawing attention to a number of these challenges, we
should be able to appreciate more why he developed in the way that he did
his main ideas about university education. But to ask whether any of those
ideas constitute a legacy that we should seek to keep alive and hand on today
requires one step more: namely, a brief description of three of the major challenges faced by Catholic higher education in our own time.

THE CHALLENGES WE FACE
First, what is the appropriate degree of independence a university should
have from national political and economic priorities? Second and intimately
related to answering the first challenge, what is the importance of liberal
education? And third, how should academic freedom be understood, especially for a Catholic university? These are, of course, great issues that continue to engage our energies and our intellects. While there is no possibility
of answering these questions with finality, we can still look to Newman for
educational insights that will strengthen our own universities today.
As long as a university education was reserved mostly to a few of the
elite males of society, it could focus, as it did, mainly on the classics, at least
as the proper preparation for one of the professions, the skills for which were
typically acquired on the job as an apprentice, but not as a part of one’s university education. Moreover, at most of these schools, moral education was
an integral part of campus life, especially in the small colleges, until at least
the middle of the 19th century. From the start of the 20th century in the
United States, and especially during the Second World War, the Korean War,
and the Cold War, the government directed more and more federal money to
universities willing to undertake research that would serve the needs of the
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state and the military. Many of the country’s leading research universities
now rely heavily on such federal funding. While nearly all Catholic universities have not followed the country’s major research universities in the
amount of government money they receive for research, a number of them
receive enough to require a serious examination of the extent to which they
have a strong enough sense of distinctive mission that would allow themselves to be more than instruments of national and social priorities. Put in
other terms, just how independent is the modern university, and for that matter Catholic universities, from the political and economic priorities of the
nation?
Another way to understand how deeply such priorities have influenced
the shape of the modern academy is to examine its salary policies. Annual
statistics now exist about the differences in salaries of various professors.
According to Hollinger (2000), we find in salary policies “compelling evidence that the gap is closing between what universities value and what is valued in the commercial marketplace” (p. 173). At its worst, what has been
happening across the country, especially in major research universities, is the
shaping of academic careers primarily by economic factors outside the academy. We see this growing disparity of salaries, continues Hollinger,
in the fields of economics, business administration, law, biotechnology, and
computer science. At the same time, those faculty whose careers are the most
fully centered in universities, and who have the least opportunity to generate
private income through consulting and other outside activities, are the ones to
whom universities pay the least. (p. 173)

One of the consequences of these economic disparities is that it becomes
more and more difficult for faculty at a single university to agree on a common mission for their institution, a mission that is not fragmented and balkanized by market forces and funding sources outside the university. In other
words, we might ask whether it is possible, given such powerful economic
pressures, for a faculty to come together and agree upon a mission of the university that goes beyond the priorities of the economy and the federal government. To do so successfully presupposes that the faculty possesses a
degree of autonomy in the face of the forces external to the academy.
A second challenge for the modern university is sustaining a vibrant
form of liberal education. Even liberal arts colleges, as distinct from universities, are increasingly pressured to prepare their graduates for the professions and the working world. And in those universities which offer a required
general education program, many of the faculty and most students think of
those courses as ones they need to “get out of the way” in order to get on to
their major, which will prepare them for acquiring a job upon graduation.
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And it need not be added that were courses in philosophy and theology not
required, few students would register for them. If a university can address the
challenge of creating a central place for the liberal arts, it will also have gone
some distance in liberating the university from being determined by economic and political needs. But expecting a modern faculty, pluralistic in outlook
and preoccupied with their own careers and the specialized demands of their
own disciplines, to agree on liberal education as central to the purpose of a
university education may be too much to ask.
Finally, the third challenge, much in Catholic news, can be stated briefly
as that of retaining autonomy and a robust academic freedom while functioning as a faithful Catholic university.

NEWMAN’S LEGACY
The first thing to note about Newman is that in his lectures he offers a comprehensive understanding of the purpose of a university education. To provide a coherent and compelling vision for the academy is no small feat. In
that undertaking, Newman has been followed in our own time by only a few
educational leaders, such as Robert Hutchins and Derek Bok. But it seems
that few people leading major universities today actually articulate an integrated vision of what a university education should be—that is, a vision
other than one whose primary purpose is to prepare a person to succeed in
today’s economy. In this way, as in a number of others, the corporatization of
the academy is a growing concern.
As suggested earlier in this analysis, by the middle of the 19th century
the shape of the university had begun to change dramatically in this country,
with more and more attention being given to the commercial and industrial
needs of society. This emphasis has reappeared in recent years as the
University of Phoenix, along with a number of commercial colleges, has
taken as its sole mission preparing people for entry into the job market.
Newman’s vision of a university education privileged liberal education. He
opposed pragmatists who believed that the only worthwhile education was
that which directly benefited the economic and industrial needs of society. At
the outset, it is important to make clear what he did not mean by a liberal
education. Numerous commentators have misunderstood Newman’s vision
as excluding professional education from the university. In fact, Newman
was proud of the School of Medicine at his newly founded Catholic university, but he was careful to explain that educating people for the professions
did not constitute the core of a university education. He wrote:
If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against Professional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a University Education, let me not be supposed...to
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be disrespectful towards particular studies, or arts, or vocations, and those who
are engaged in them. In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a
University course, I do not mean to imply that the University does not teach
Law or Medicine. What indeed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something
particular? It teaches all knowledge by teaching all branches of knowledge, and
in no other way. (1976, p. 145)

If a professor of medicine or geology were to teach outside of a university,
he or she would be, according to Newman, nothing more than a professor of
medicine or geology. Inside a university, such a professor should, in
Newman’s view, know where his or her subject stands in relation to all the
other subjects, and from that understanding will have gained from those
other subjects “a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and
self-possession” (Newman, 1976, p. 146).
Nor was a liberal education only a superficial knowledge about a lot of
things. Intellectual dilettantes, in Newman’s estimation, were capable only of
“viewiness,” a state that enfeebled the mind. He commented that “an intellectual man, as the world now conceives of him, is one who is full of ‘views’
on all subjects...of the day. It is almost thought a disgrace not to have a view
at a moment’s notice on any question” (1976, p. 13). Rather, real knowledge
for Newman is a certain formation of the mind, a capacity to “do philosophy,” which means the ability to put things in order and relate them as they
should be related. Again, Newman writing about the purpose of a university
education:
The result is a formation of mind, that is, a habit of order and system, a habit
of referring every accession of knowledge to what we already know, and of
adjusting the one with the other; and, moreover, as such a habit implies, the
actual acceptance and use of certain principles as centres of thought, around
which our knowledge grows and is located. Where this critical faculty exists,
history is no longer a mere story-book, or biography a romance; orators and
publications of the day are no longer infallible authorities; eloquent diction is
no longer a substitute for matter, nor bold statements, or lively descriptions,
substitute for proof. (1976, p. 404)

At the heart of Newman’s vision of a liberally educated person is the capacity to think critically. Again, in his own words:
It [a university education] gives a man a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing
them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go
right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with cred-
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it, and to master any subject with facility. (1976, p. 154)

A university that commits itself to a strong liberal arts core, to close curricular collaboration between the College of Arts and Sciences and the professional schools, and to preparing its graduates not only for their professions but even more for living their lives in service and leadership—a university with a faculty that embraces these commitments will provide an education that goes beyond meeting goals determined only by national politics
and that does more than create curricula shaped only by the economy. It
would be naïve to think that agreement about the importance of liberal education will by itself radically alter salary policies set by the market. It should,
however, help universities come to a deeper sense of their distinctive purpose, a purpose that cannot be described in market terms only.
The third challenge is that of academic freedom. Our focus in this essay
is academic freedom in a Catholic university. How does a university go about
both protecting a robust form of academic freedom and also functioning as
a faithful Catholic university? If the first challenge requires that the university retain an appropriate autonomy in the face of external political and economic pressures and the second that it defend the centrality of a liberal education, this challenge requires that the Catholic university retain a relationship with the Church that is likewise appropriately autonomous. Perhaps in
this area of academic freedom some of Newman’s statements seem extreme.
Sometimes, he so emphasizes the authority of the pope that it would seem
that a Catholic is bound in conscience to accept any official teaching; he has
little to say about the authority of bishops or their importance in the formulation of papal teaching. At other times, as Kerr (1991) points out, he seems
to limit, as he does in his Vatican Decrees, the official teachings of the
Church to doctrines that determine what a Catholic is to think, but that,
Newman claims, will have nothing to do with behavior—a position that
would not make sense in the light of Humanae Vitae (Paul VI, 1968), the
encyclical that condemned artificial contraception, unless one wishes simply
to say that this teaching is not infallible and therefore can be ignored. To
defend on the basis of such reasoning a dismissal of the 1968 teaching would
also defend a dismissal of teaching against racism and abortion, neither of
which has been formally defined infallibly. Obviously, more thinking needs
to be done on this matter. And finally, Newman also writes, at times passionately, about the importance of giving theologians room to question and
explore, without the immediate intervention of the hierarchy. In the midst of
these different emphases, it is important to recall that Newman is a controversialist and a rhetorician, and that he seldom wrote without having
received “a call,” that is, without being invited to respond to a specific
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issue—such as establishing a university or rebutting false interpretations of
papal infallibility.
Having pointed out the contrasting if not contradictory character of some
of Newman’s positions on the teaching authority of the Church and academic freedom, one may wonder whether Newman can offer us some helpful
insight into this complex topic of academic freedom. One of Newman’s most
interesting and original treatments of Church authority can be found in his
preface to the third edition of his 1877 Via Media of the Anglican Church,
where he describes how the Church is at one and the same time prophetic,
priestly, and regal:
Christianity, then, is at once a philosophy, a political power, and a religious rite:
as a religion, it is Holy; as a philosophy, it is Apostolic; as a political power, it
is imperial, that is, One and Catholic. As a religion, its special centre of action
is pastor and flock; as a philosophy, the Schools; as a rule, the Papacy and its
Curia. (1978, p. xl)

For Newman, the priestly function operates in parishes and among laity; the
prophetic is exercised by theologians; and the regal is the pope and the curia.
And while occasionally a bishop might be a great teacher, in the ordinary life
of the Church sustaining the truth of the Gospel calls for an ongoing interaction, indeed a tension, among all three offices. The faith of the Church, largely the laity, the writings of theologians and the oversight exercised by bishops and the pope interact, sometimes collide, but ultimately correct each
other’s excesses. In a recent article, Dulles (2005) finds Newman’s division
of offices problematic for today’s Church:
The laity are far more educated and more critical than the simple believers
Newman has in mind. Theologians, many of whom are laypeople, do not constitute anything like the medieval schola theologorum. We do not commonly
think of theologians as judges of orthodoxy, as was common in the late Middle
Ages, but rather as explorers whose hypotheses need to be critically assessed
by the hierarchical magisterium. As for the Pope and the bishops, we expect
them to be guardians of revealed truth and not to yield to considerations of
expediency. We connect the priestly office with the public liturgy rather than,
as Newman did, with private devotions. (p. 17)

Dulles notes that in Lumen Gentium (Vatican Council II, 1965, §21), the
three offices are located in an “eminent and visible way” in the bishops. In a
similar way, Dulles (1985) locates years before the so-called “Protestant
Principle” (a commitment to purification) within the “Catholic Substance”
(a commitment to preservation) so that Catholicism retains within itself the
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capacity for self-correction. When the hierarchy functions in an ideal way
and when Catholicism as a whole is capable of correcting itself through its
own internal sources, Dulles’ syntheses of functions in the bishops and in the
Catholic Church make good sense. However, the historical experience of the
Church also indicates that many times challenges that come from outside the
Catholic Church move it to re-examine its own rich tradition for important
insights that have remained dormant and overlooked. For example, certain
themes of Enlightenment thinkers actually helped the Church affirm at
Vatican II its own doctrine of “religious freedom” and the separation of
Church and state, just as the prophetic activity of early 19th century
Protestants protesting slavery helped the Church formally condemn slavery
many years later; that the Protestant emphasis on the importance of the normative character of the Word of God led the Church at Vatican II to state
clearly that the pope in his teaching is under that Word and not above it; and
finally, that increasing influential roles of the laity resulted in the fuller elaboration at Vatican II of the role of the sensus fidelium as the rule of faith for
the entire Church.
These examples would suggest that Dulles’ conclusion that Newman’s
division of roles can be problematic, but nonetheless does have some validity, especially when we consider how in the light of its own history Church
teaching has developed. Newman himself knew that all three offices tend,
apart from their relationship with the other two, to become one-sided.
Concerning theology he states that it
cannot always have its own way; it is too hard, too intellectual, too exact, to be
always equitable, or to be always compassionate; and it sometimes has a conflict or overthrow, or has to consent to a truce or a compromise, in consequence
of the rival force of religious sentiment or ecclesiastical interests; and that,
sometimes in great matters, sometimes in unimportant. (as cited in Misner,
1976, p. 170)

Newman also argues that one of the important roles for dogmas and
papal infallibility in the life of the Church is their ability, for the believing
Catholic, to check, as it were, the “restless energy” of the intellect. He
describes the relationship between Church authority and theologians as—
remember, Newman is a rhetorician—a “never-dying duel…necessary for
the very life of religion” (as cited by Ker, 1994, p. 10). Newman’s striking
rhetoric is hardly meant to be a systematic treatment of how theologians and
Church authorities should interact; rather, Newman suggests that it is an
ongoing process that over time takes many forms. Of course, some theologians today see their only role as defending the teachings of the magisterium, while other theologians dedicate themselves not only to their defense,
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but also to an on-going critique of them. That theologians need to work at the
faithful appropriation of the tradition and that bishops need to welcome
thoughtful criticism of official teachings approximates the balance that
Dulles affirms, but that in the actual life of the Church is not always typical.
Newman lives that tension between defense and critique, and offers us not
only his personal example, but also his writings as testimony to the pursuit
of that balance.
But what about the relationship of the university to the teaching authority of the Church? In his ninth discourse, “Duties of the Church Toward
Knowledge,” Newman wrote what today would seem to be, at first hearing,
the capitulation of any autonomy of the university to the Church. He wrote:
If the Catholic Faith is true, a University cannot exist externally to the Catholic
pale, for it cannot teach Universal Knowledge if it does not teach Catholic theology. This is certain; but still, though it had ever so many theological Chairs,
that would not suffice to make it a Catholic University; for theology would be
included in its teaching only as a branch of knowledge, only as one out of many
constituent portions, however important a one, of what I have called
Philosophy. Hence a direct and active jurisdiction of the Church over it and in
it is necessary, lest it should become the rival of the Church with the community at large in those theological matters which to the Church are exclusively
committed—acting as the representative of the intellect, as the Church is the
representative of the religious principle. (Newman, 1976, p. 184)

This lengthy quotation requires a longer commentary than can be offered
here. Newman insisted that a university should teach universal knowledge; a
“non-sectarian” university is not, according to Newman, a real university,
since it excludes an ancient and highly developed field of knowledge, namely theology. And for a Catholic university, Catholic theology has a special
place because of its roots in the history and life of the Church itself. Two
things, however, need to be emphasized for our purposes, first a number of
qualifications made by Newman that support a genuine academic freedom
and autonomy for a Catholic university, and second, the way in which the
most recent developments in Catholic higher education, particularly with the
publication of John Paul II’s 1990 apostolic constitution, Ex Corde Ecclesiae,
do the same in a new context (Heft, 2006).
Newman frequently emphasized that as knowledge developed, insight
was increased and wisdom finally acquired through conflict and challenge.
He defended room for scholars, including theologians, to disagree without
the immediate intervention of the Church, especially after he became a
Catholic. In speaking of scientific research, he wrote that
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it is the very law of the human mind in its inquiry...to make its advances by a
process which...is circuitous. There are no shortcuts to knowledge....In scientific researches error may be said, without paradox, to be in some instances the
way to truth, and the only way. (Newman, 1976, p. 382)

And again, in describing the inner life of a university as a diverse and disputatious community, he wrote:
It is a place to which a thousand schools make contribution; in which the intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in some antagonist
activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth. It is a place where inquiry is
pushed forwards, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the
collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge. (Newman, 2001,
p. 16)

And then, one of Newman’s most famous statements about how a true academic thinks:
If he has one cardinal maxim in his philosophy, it is, that truth cannot be contrary to truth; if he has a second, it is, that truth often seems contrary to truth;
and, if a third, it is the practical conclusion, that we must be patient with such
appearances, and not be hasty to pronounce them to be really of a more formidable character. (Newman, 1976, p. 372)

And finally, the scholar’s “watchword is, Live and let live. He takes things as
they are; he submits to them all, as far as they go” (Newman, 1976, p. 372).
Newman often counseled both professor and bishop to have greater confidence in the power of the academy over time to sort out truth from error. A
little over a decade after giving these addresses, Newman (1973) expressed
clearly that the bishops would do best to leave the university to itself, to its
own self-governance, because “till it is able to act as a free being, it will be
but a sickly child” (p. 46).
How might Newman help us in our own times? After considerable debate
and dialogue between bishops and the leaders of Catholic colleges and universities, the 1990 Vatican document on higher education called upon bishops
to help protect the university’s autonomy versus the state even as it called
upon them to leave the internal governance of Catholic universities to lay
boards of trustees. Ex Corde Ecclesiae includes two sentences of special relevance here. The first addresses the university’s autonomy with regard to the
state, and reads: “Bishops have a particular responsibility to promote Catholic
universities, and especially to promote and assist in the preservation and
strengthening of their Catholic identity, including the protection of their

372

Catholic Education/March 2007

Catholic identity in relation to civil authorities” (John Paul II, 1990, §28). The
Catholic identity referred to here includes more than simply theology; it
includes the commitment to draw out and reflect upon the ethical and moral
dimensions of all the disciplines, a far reaching and largely unaccomplished
project. The second relevant sentence addresses the autonomy of the Catholic
university in relationship to the bishop, and reads: “Even when they [bishops]
do not enter directly into the internal governance of the university, bishops
‘should be seen not as external agents but as participants in the life of the
Catholic university’” (John Paul II, 1990, §28). The “even when” qualification might give pause until it is realized that the bishops in the United States,
in their implementation of Ex Corde, have renounced any direct authority in
the governance of a Catholic university, even in the case of a Catholic theologian to whose writings and teaching they may object. This statement welcomes the bishop’s influence, but not his control. It recognizes his right to
make judgments about the soundness of Catholic teaching, but not the right
to control hiring or firing of any faculty, including Catholic theologians.
Newman would be quite pleased with this arrangement. He constantly
pushed for a well-educated laity, and wanted them to be fully involved in the
running of the university. The gifts of an educated laity have not always been
welcomed by members of the hierarchy. Bishop Talbot, a great opponent of
Newman, once famously asked, “What is the role of province of the laity? To
hunt, to shoot, to entertain? These matters they understand, but to meddle with
ecclesiastical matters they have no right at all” (as cited in Coulson, 1961, pp.
41-42). Newman also met resistance among the Irish bishops when he proposed that lay people share in the governance of the university the bishops
asked him to found (O’Connell, 2004). And in 1907 in Pius X’s condemnation of modernism, we read, “Note venerable brethren (bishops) the appearance already of that most pernicious doctrine which would make of the laity
a factor of progress in the Church” (Pius X, 1907/1981, p. 83). We can be
thankful to Newman and to Vatican Council II, among others, for a greater
recognition of the important role of the laity in the life of the Church. Perhaps
nowhere else in the Church today is the close collaboration of intelligent and
well-educated laity, religious and clergy, dedicated to thinking about the
Catholic faith and its traditions, to be found evident and vital except in
Catholic universities. Again, Newman saw this with great clarity over 130
years ago when, in an 1873 letter to an officer of the university he wrote:
You will be doing the greatest possible benefit to the Catholic cause all over the
world, if you succeed in making the University a middle station at which clergy and laity can meet, so as to learn to understand and to yield to each other—
and from which, as from a common ground, they may act in union upon an age,
which is running headlong into infidelity. (as cited by Morgan, 2004, p. 33)
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In our own day, the university should welcome the counsel and advice of
its bishop, and continue to draw freely and fully from Catholic intellectual
traditions, and yet itself, with the support of the bishops, remain autonomous
and its scholars, mostly lay people, free in the conduct of their teaching and
research. To achieve this balance, conversations and collaboration are necessary. If Catholic universities are to welcome episcopal advice, then they
should structure regular conversations with their bishops, conversations that
take place all too rarely at present. The preoccupations of academics and
diocesan pastors need not be mutually exclusive any more than the concerns
of academics and those in campus ministry within the university.

CONCLUSION
It is nearly impossible to grasp adequately the significance of the changes
that have taken place in our English, American, and Catholic educational
institutions since the 1850s. Nevertheless, elements of Newman’s vision of a
university education continue to be relevant today, not least his emphasis on
liberal education at the core of a university education. Universities must contribute to the success of their graduates or they are useless. But liberal education cannot be the cultural frosting on the cake of professional competence—it has to be critical of the very structures we are teaching students to
succeed in, unless we fool ourselves into thinking our social order is already
ideal. And once we begin to raise questions about the structures of society,
we will also challenge conventional caricatures of morality. We will be
forced also to ask who is exploited so that we might continue to enjoy cheap
food and clothing.
When we focus our attention on what it means to be human, to be free
and responsible and loving and generous, we will be forced to examine all
those personal ways and societal structures that fall short of those ideals. And
the university is a privileged place to carry on that exploration, a place that
must sustain the intimate relation between intellectual and moral formation,
and protect its academic freedom and its autonomy.
Recent Vatican documents have gone some distance in clarifying the university’s academic freedom and institutional autonomy. Unlike Newman
arguing for a real university in mid-19th century Ireland where the Catholic
Church was established, we live in a country that both accepts the separation
of Church and state and affirms religious freedom as a right. Our challenge
today is less a matter of seeking freedom from the Church, as it is seeking
appropriate ways for a Catholic university to draw deeply from the life and
culture of Catholicism, all the while doing so as a university community that
can benefit from a much greater diversity among its faculty and students
than Newman ever knew or desired.
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In both the Church and the academy, we still have a long way to go to
learn how to disagree, without turning to rancor, how to seek the truth
through welcoming a vigorous but civil give and take of ideas, and how to
draw deeply from the life and wisdom of the Church even as we employ the
canons of criticism and verification that may cause tensions with the larger
community of believers. In facing these challenges, key elements of
Newman’s vision of higher education remain relevant. For these reasons,
Newman’s vision of a university needs to be retrieved, critiqued, and embodied in today’s universities.
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